The Presidency — By Prince Emeka Obasi
Business Hallmark Newspaper, October 12–19, 2009

There are two basic fears that gnaw at me. It is not even all the doomsday talk about the imminence of Nigeria’s implosion. There is that too. But frankly, it does not rank in the top echelon of my worries. And not because I do not share the concern of those who worry. Of course I do. It is just that to paraphrase a famous quotation, the stories of Nigeria’s impending doom is much exaggerated. Indeed, it would appear as if many commentators on Nigeria tend to underrate the strength of the ties that bind her diverse peoples. So when I worry, it is not usually because of the fear that one of these days, we may all wake up and discover that each of our states or geo-political zones has become a Federal Republic of some sort.

My worries are usually of more immediate matters. The first one is that if for any reason (God forbid) President Yar’Adua does not serve a second term in office, the North will most certainly insist on serving for a fresh two consecutive four-year terms, which will bring the cumulative total to twelve years. Given the nature of politics in Nigeria and what incumbents do to retain power, it will be severely difficult or impossible to dislodge the incumbent in 2015. At any rate, the two zones, South East and South South, are too weak to mount a credible challenge for the top job.

For much of her independence, Nigeria has been a de facto duopoly, with real power and influence revolving between the North and South West. The chance of the South East was the brief interregnum of Aguiyi Ironsi, and its influence began and ended with the career and death of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. In 49 years of independence, the North and South West have shared power for 48 and a half years! For all the noise about South South resurgence, the plight of Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, easily Nigeria’s weakest Vice President in history, weaker than even Alex Ekwueme and Ebitu Ukiwe, is instructive. A political office holder is only as powerful as his people. Now you can understand why Atiku Abubakar was so very powerful. He had to be given real powers in order to placate the North, who are too powerful to be mere ciphers. For Jonathan, Obasanjo could not even do him the honour of allowing him produce the Governor of his native Bayelsa State. Anyway, so my fear is that in 2015, power may not easily revert to the South East, or South South. It is more likely to remain in the North. That raises very scary prospects for the country.

It will be interesting to know how the South East, the only other zone to have ruled the country, will respond to such a scenario. But to determine that, we have to examine how the South East handled power in the brief period it was at the helm of affairs.

Aguiyi Ironsi came to power as the beneficiary of a coup, which he neither organised nor participated in. He is best remembered for two basic things: his handling of the Nzeogwu coup which was one of the reasons cited by the July 1966 counter-coupists, and the promulgation of Decree 33, popularly known as the unification decree which caused a storm. The late General Murtala Mohammed had famously sworn that the decree could only work over his dead body. Obviously he did not die, and the decree did not work. Instead, Ironsi died. What has happened to the Igbo, post-Ironsi, is an interesting study in the steady decline of a once powerful geo-political group. Unlike the Yoruba who has managed to project a definitive vision of Nigeria, the Igbo position has been fluid at best and at worst, confused and inconsistent.

A careful reading of the Igbo political template reveals two broad strands, which is dissected by political linkages. One strand, promoted by younger elements who coalesce around the South West, broadly support the Yoruba world view. It is the platform of the Olisa Agbakobas, Ndubuisi Kanus, the late Chima Ubani, Ebitu Ukiwe, Ken Nnamani, Pini Jason, Joe Igbokwe etc. The other strand has a more conservative leaning, embracing a vision that is more in tandem with the Northern world view. They include Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, Jim Nwobodo, Orji Kalu, the Nwodos, Anyim Pius Ayim, Edwin Umezeoke etc. There are some who would argue that there is yet a third strand, encompassing a motley crowd inspired by the likes of Abdulazeez Udeh, Anya O. Anya, Ziggy Azike etc. who try to make a case for an independent Igbo vision not yoked to either of the two major powers. But the effort has not yielded much dividends. Igbo response to Nigeria lacks authenticity when stripped of the influence of North and South West geopolitics. Such difficulties reflect a basic Igbo problem, the inability to evolve a defining characteristic in responding to the Nigerian situation.

Many commentators have attributed the problem to the crisis of the civil war, which wreaked psychological havoc on the Igbo, shattering its self-esteem, denigrating its social mores and enthroning a new value system that appears to be fundamentally underpinned by the material.

So post-civil war Igbo has become politically dysfunctional and unable to achieve a sense of cohesion, unanimity of perspective and commonality of objectives. The Igbo political elite developed a marginality complex in response to the policy — official and unofficial — of successive governments to keep the Igbo at the margins of power. Even the few Igbos who manage to attain power whether as Governors, Ministers, Senate Presidents etc. have exercised such powers with obvious timidity. In fact, the situation used to be worse. During the military era, the few Igbos in power were notorious in their attitude of downplaying their ethnic origins and identities. Even officers are often Igbos. They are the ones who ban vernacular in their offices and promote pan-Nigerian policies. But the irony of the Igbo conundrum is that for all his efforts at promoting ethnic neutrality, the preponderant perception of most Nigerians is that Igbos are ethnic bigots. That such perception flies in the face of evidence does not quite matter. So, the typical Igbo political leader is largely distrusted and viewed with a large measure of scepticism and suspicion, especially when he attempts an independent position on issues. It is little wonder therefore that the most successful Igbo politicians have tended to be those aligned to either the North or the South West. The space in between is rather cold and foreboding.

What I will find interesting is how an Igbo will emerge President in 2015. Because as far as I am concerned, there is little in the books to suggest the feasibility of that proposition. But as they say, politics is the art of the possible. My hunch is that if the North is persuaded to cede power, it might prefer the Igbo to the South South; a resurgent geo-political zone that has sorely rattled the North.